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Bowen, Ragjopal, and Venkatachalam (2008) explore whether managers, on average, use accounting
discretion for reporting objectives that are in the interests of shareholders (e.g., signaling, tax minimization,
etc.), or alternatively whether managers use discretion opportunistically in the presence of governance
structures that allow greater discretion. The authors find that although accounting discretion is positively
related to governance structures that allow managers greater discretion in decision-making, there is no
evidence that the portion of accounting discretion related to governance structures is negatively associated
with firm performance. In this discussion, I emphasize the importance of decision rights allocation within
widely held corporations, and how this allocation naturally leads to cross-sectional variation in the degree of
discretion afforded managers. In contrast to much of the existing governance literature, I argue that
governance structures that allow managers greater discretion in making decisions do not necessarily imply
weak/poor governance. For example, it is difficult to see why a firm that allocates the least possible decision-
making rights to their board or executives is necessarily the firm with highest quality governance. I also discuss
why the observed relation between accounting discretion and firm performance may be uninformative about
whether accounting discretion is used for opportunistic purposes. If shareholders/boards thoughtfully select
an appropriate amount of overall decision-making discretion to allow managers, it will be difficult to
determine whether specific types of discretion are used opportunistically.
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Bowen, Ragjopal, and Venkatachalam (2008) explore whether managers, on average, use 
accounting discretion for reporting objectives that are in the interests of shareholders (e.g., 
signaling, tax minimization, etc.), or alternatively whether managers use discretion 
opportunistically in the presence of governance structures that allow greater discretion. The 
authors find that although accounting discretion is positively related to governance 
structures that allow managers greater discretion in decision-making, there is no evidence 
that the portion of accounting discretion related to governance structures is negatively 
associated with firm performance. 
 
In this discussion, I emphasize the importance of decision rights allocation within widely 
held corporations, and how this allocation naturally leads to cross-sectional variation in the 
degree of discretion afforded managers. In contrast to much of the existing governance 
literature, I argue that governance structures that allow managers greater discretion in 
making decisions do not necessarily imply weak/poor governance. For example, it is 
difficult to see why a firm that allocates the least possible decision-making rights to their 
board or executives is necessarily the firm with highest quality governance. I also discuss 
why the observed relation between accounting discretion and firm performance may be 
uninformative about whether accounting discretion is used for opportunistic purposes. If 
shareholders/boards thoughtfully select an appropriate amount of overall decision-making 
discretion to allow managers, it will be difficult to determine whether specific types of 
discretion are used opportunistically.        
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Bowen, Ragjopal, and Venkatachalam (BRV, 2008) explore whether managers, on 
average, use accounting discretion for reporting objectives that are in the interest of 
shareholders (e.g., signaling, tax minimization, etc.), or alternatively for opportunistic 
purposes that benefit managers to the detriment of shareholders. They begin by noting that 
prior research often infers evidence of the opportunism hypothesis from findings that 
accounting discretion is more prevalent in firms with “poor/weak” governance quality 
(e.g., Klein, 2002; Menon and Williams, 2004). BRV argue, however, that if accounting 
discretion is primarily used for opportunistic purposes, one should observe negative effects 
of this discretion in firm performance. Failure to find such a relation between accounting 
discretion and firm performance, the authors reasonably argue, calls into question the 
validity of the inferences in prior research.  
The authors re-examine the opportunism hypothesis by first isolating the portion of 
accounting discretion that is correlated with variation in governance structures. Consistent 
with prior results, they find that greater accounting discretion is associated with 
“poor/weak” governance, where “poor/weak” is generally defined as governance structures 
that allow management considerable discretion in their decision making (a key feature of 
many governance measures that I will critique below). The authors then set out to test the 
joint hypothesis that accounting discretion is used primarily for opportunistic purposes and 
that governance structures are “poor/weak” when they allow greater accounting discretion. 
They test this joint hypothesis by examining whether the portion of accounting discretion 
that is correlated with variation in governance structures is associated with poor future firm 
performance. The authors find no evidence of such a relation and infer that “managers do 
not abuse accounting discretion at the expense of firms’ shareholders.”    
In this discussion, I emphasize two main points relevant to BRV’s analysis and 
inferences. First, I discuss the importance of decision rights allocation within widely held 
corporations and how this naturally leads to cross-sectional variation in the degree of 
discretion afforded managers. In contrast to much of the existing governance literature, I 
argue that governance structures that allow managers greater discretion in making 
decisions do not necessarily imply “weak/poor” governance. In particular, it is difficult to 
see why a firm that allocates the least possible decision-making rights to their board or 
executives is necessarily the firm with highest quality governance. Second, a finding that 
greater accounting discretion is not associated with poor firm performance may imply little 
or nothing about whether accounting discretion is used for opportunistic purposes. If firms 
make optimal decisions regarding the amount of overall decision-making discretion to 
allow managers, it will be difficult or impossible, to determine whether specific types of 
discretion are used opportunistically. 
2. Allocation of Decision Rights in Organizations 
The allocation of decision rights within an organization is a fundamental building 
block of organizational structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1990). Because it is costly to 
transfer information in a timely manner across individuals in an organization, it is easy to 
see the merits of collocating decision rights with those individuals who possess the 
information necessary to best make decisions. At the same time, the organization needs to 
consider agency problems, and whether the individuals holding the decision-relevant 
knowledge have appropriate incentives to take actions that are in the best interests of the 
owners of the organization.  
These basic principles of allocating decision rights within an organization play an 
important role in designing the contracting relations between shareholders, the board of 
directors, and senior management. In widely-held corporations, it is well understood that 
substantial decision rights are allocated by shareholders to the board of directors, due in 
part to the considerable information costs and coordination costs that would be necessary 
for shareholders to make many key decisions themselves. In turn, and for many of the 
same reasons, the board of directors allocates substantial decision rights to executive 
management. Executive managers involved in the day-to-day activities of the firm are 
likely to have much better decision-relevant knowledge, and can take actions in a more 
timely manner than board members or shareholders. At the same time, shareholders and 
boards are rightfully concerned about agency conflicts with executive managers and the 
possibility that such managers will take opportunistic actions that benefit themselves to the 
detriment of shareholders.  
As noted by Jensen and Meckling (1990), one can view these two organizational 
costs along upward sloping continuums. In an organization where decision rights are fully 
co-located with the managers holding the decision-relevant knowledge, the costs of 
making uninformed decisions are small, but agency costs are potentially large. In an 
organization where managers are restricted in their decision rights, which are instead 
retained by shareholders or boards, agency costs will be small, but the costs of making 
uninformed decisions are large. Total organization costs will be minimized at the level of 
decision-rights allocation where the sum of these two costs is lowest.  
Naturally, shareholders are motivated to choose, or at least move toward, a level of 
decision-rights allocation that is expected to minimize total organization costs. Further, 
firms with different economic characteristics are expected to choose different levels of 
decision rights allocation. For example, in firms where decision-specific knowledge is 
complex and difficult to transfer, or dynamic settings where decisions must typically be 
made quickly, managers are likely to be given considerable discretion to make decisions. 
Likewise, in firms where shareholders and/or boards are confident in their monitoring 
ability and therefore less concerned about agency conflicts, managers are also likely to be 
given considerable discretion to make decisions.  
3. Corporate Governance Measures of Discretion Allocated to Boards and Managers 
In many ways, commonly used measures of corporate governance capture variation 
in the “tightness” or “looseness” of constraints placed on executives’ decision-making, or 
said a different way, the degree of discretion or “length of rope” that executives are 
allowed in making decisions. For example, consider the variety of common governance 
measures examined by BRV. One such measure that has gained tremendous recent 
popularity with researchers is the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance score (“g 
score”) that measures the incidence of various corporate provisions related to shareholder 
rights. As is standard in the literature, BRV interpret this measure as providing an 
indication of governance quality, where firms that concentrate greater decision-making 
rights in the hands of shareholders, and less decision-making rights in the hands of boards 
or executives, are considered to have higher quality (i.e., better) governance. The 
arguments above, however, suggest that such a view is at best incomplete. It is difficult to 
see why a firm that allocates the least possible decision-making rights to their board or 
executives is necessarily the firm with highest quality governance. Rather, one can imagine 
that shareholders optimally choose to allocate greater decision-making rights to boards and 
executives when it is most important for these individuals to have such authority, or when 
expected agency costs of doing so are not large. 
Similarly, many of the other governance proxies examined by BRV also appear to 
capture aspects of the allocation of decision-making rights to executives. Whether the CEO 
is the chair of the board, the proportion of insiders on the board, and the number of board 
meetings can all be viewed as measures of how much autonomy or decision-making 
authority is granted to the CEO and top executives. For example, a board that is optimized 
to assist management with project selection and investment decisions may justifiably 
appoint insiders with firm- and industry-specific knowledge that are not necessarily 
independent of the CEO. Fama and Jensen (1983) make this point by noting that since the 
board is to be comprised of experts, it is natural that the most influential members are 
internal managers with valuable firm-specific information about the organization. Some of 
BRV’s other governance variables, such as the extent of stock and option holdings by the 
CEO, can be viewed as proxies for monitoring mechanisms that can mitigate potential 
agency costs associated with the optimal allocation of decision rights to executives.2 That 
is, when greater decision rights are allocated to executives, equity incentives can serve to 
ensure that executives use these decision rights to take actions in the best interests of 
shareholders. 
                                                 
2 A puzzling aspect of the authors’ discussion of equity holdings, is that greater stock holdings are viewed as 
a mechanism to mitigate agency conflicts, whereas greater stock option holdings are viewed as increasing 
agency conflicts. From an economic perspective, it is difficult to understand this stark difference in 
perspective. Since the values of both stock and option holdings derive from the stock price, and both types of 
securities are subject to executives’ decisions on liquidation, it is difficult to see how the agency costs 
stemming from these two types of securities give rise to opposite predictions.  While a body of literature 
claims that greater stock options leads to more fraud, more recent studies suggest these earlier results may be 
spurious (e.g., Armstrong, Jagonlinzer, and Larcker, 2007; Hribar and Nichols, 2007).   
The role of decision-right allocation in corporate governance structures is likely to 
have important implications for the relation between corporate governance and discretion 
in financial accounting choices. It is not hard to imagine that executives who are granted 
greater decision-making discretion, in general, will also have greater discretion with 
respect to making accounting choices. For example, when the CEO is granted substantial 
autonomy by allowing him/her to be board chair and by including insiders on the board, it 
would not be surprising to observe greater discretion being used by management across a 
variety of dimensions, including project selection, financing activities, mergers and 
acquisitions, executive compensation, and accounting policy. In other words, when 
shareholders deem it appropriate to allow executives greater decision rights, it seems likely 
that one would observe greater executive discretion across all of the various dimensions of 
decision-making, including accounting choices. If this is correct, one expects to observe a 
positive relation between corporate governance choices that allow discretion, and 
accounting choices that reflect such discretion. Importantly, however, neither corporate 
governance discretion nor accounting discretion is expected necessarily to indicate “good” 
or “bad” corporate governance or accounting policy. 
4. Interpretation of the Authors’ Results  
The authors’ primary objective in the paper is to investigate whether management’s 
use of accounting discretion is best viewed as being detrimental to shareholders, or 
alternatively as being used for purposes that benefit shareholders. A large volume of papers 
articulate reasons why accounting discretion can either benefit or harm shareholders. One 
side of the debate argues that accounting discretion has been purposefully allowed within 
GAAP to allow managers to tailor their financial statements to provide the most accurate 
and informative representation of their firm’s financial position. Further, accounting 
discretion can be used to avoid debt covenant violation, reduce political costs or taxes, or 
meet certain forecasting benchmarks, all of which can be beneficial to the firm’s 
shareholders (although sometimes potentially detrimental to creditors and other parties). 
The other side of the debate argues that managers use accounting discretion mainly for 
opportunistic purposes, such as to manipulate bonuses or facilitate personal stock sales at 
inflated prices, thereby benefiting themselves to the detriment of shareholders.    
It is not clear that the authors’ tests discriminate between these opposing 
viewpoints on the role of accounting discretion. The authors’ primary empirical research 
design first extracts the component of accounting discretion that is correlated with 
variation in corporate governance structures. Accounting discretion is measured using 
three common empirical constructs: abnormal accruals, earnings smoothing via accruals, 
and incidence of small positive earnings surprises. The authors then correlate the 
governance-explained-component of accounting discretion with firms’ future financial 
performance, measured using stock returns, operating cash flows and earnings 
performance. As acknowledged by the authors, future stock returns may be the most 
problematic of the three performance measures due to the fact that investors are likely to 
understand variation in how firms use accounting discretion, and can incorporate any 
relevant effects into current period stock prices.     
The authors explore two key hypotheses regarding their empirical analysis. First, 
they hypothesize that if corporate governance is structured optimally, one should observe 
no relation between corporate governance and accounting discretion after controlling for 
the economic determinants of accounting discretion (e.g., size, leverage, growth, 
performance, etc.). Second, they predict that if accounting discretion mainly reflects 
opportunistic managerial behavior, one should observe a negative relation between 
accounting discretion attributable to governance structures and future firm performance.   
The authors’ first prediction is problematic because, as noted above, one might 
naturally expect a positive correlation between discretion allowed within governance 
structures and discretion observed in accounting choices.  Further, because identical 
economic determinants may underlie the choice of discretion in both corporate governance 
and accounting choices, it might be virtually impossible to identify an important 
component of accounting discretion that is associated with governance structures, but is 
unrelated to the economic determinants of shareholders decisions regarding how much 
decision-making discretion to allow managers. In other words, an empirical finding that 
accounting discretion is correlated with governance structures neither implies that 
corporate governance is sub-optimal, nor that the component of accounting discretion that 
is explained by corporate governance structures reflects opportunistic behavior on the part 
of boards or executives.           
The authors’ second prediction on the relation between accounting discretion and 
future performance is certainly useful to consider, but is also potentially problematic. As 
noted above, accounting discretion can be used by executives either to improve corporate 
disclosure (i.e., for “good” purposes), or for opportunistic purposes (i.e., for “bad” 
purposes). Also noted above is that allowing executives greater decision rights in general 
comes with both benefits (e.g., better and quicker project selection choices) and costs (e.g., 
agency conflicts). If accounting discretion is on average used for “good” purposes, and 
firms have optimally selected the degree of discretion granted to executives, one does not 
expect to find a relation (either positive or negative) between firm performance and 
accounting discretion (or the component of accounting discretion correlated with 
governance, and firm performance). If, on the other hand, accounting discretion is on 
average used for “bad” purposes, and if firms have sub-optimally selected the degree of 
discretion granted to executives, then it may well be that measures of discretion are 
negatively correlated with future performance. 
At the same time, however, it should be recognized that if accounting discretion is 
on average used for “bad” purposes, but firms understand this and optimally select the 
degree of discretion granted to executives, one does not necessarily expect to find a 
relation (either positive or negative) between accounting discretion and firm performance. 
Although this latter statement may seem odd, it stems from the fact that it is not clear 
whether accounting policy choice is a first-order consideration when shareholders are 
deciding how much discretion to allow boards and executives. It is not hard to imagine that 
shareholders’ first-order concern in allocating decision-making authority to executives 
revolves around key business activities such as project selection, mergers and acquisitions, 
hiring and firing decisions, etc. Shareholders may well recognize that granting boards and 
executives discretion along these dimensions will have certain unavoidable “side effects”, 
such as difficult-to-mitigate agency costs that take the form of accounting discretion, 
excess perquisite consumption, or other forms of excess compensation. The cross-sectional 
variation in discretion allowed to managers likely reflects the aggregate consideration of all 
of these benefits and costs. In summary, the failure to find a negative relation between 
accounting discretion and firm performance may imply either that accounting discretion is 
on average used for “good” purposes, or that accounting discretion is on average used for 
“bad” purposes but that firms understand this and factor it into their decisions regarding 
the degree of overall decision-making discretion to allow management.  
5. Conclusion 
The allocation of decision rights within an organization is a fundamental building 
block of organizational structure. In widely-held corporations, a key aspect of the 
governance structure lies in deciding how much autonomy and decision-making discretion 
to allow senior executives. Importantly, in this context, it is not useful to view greater 
discretion as either better or worse than less discretion since the economic costs and 
benefits of allocating decision rights to managers are expected to differ across 
organizations.    
Bowen, Ragjopal, and Venkatachalam (2008) examine discretion in accounting 
choices as one important aspect of managers’ decision-making discretion. They provide 
evidence that the use of accounting discretion is positively associated with overall 
discretion in corporate governance structures, and that accounting discretion is not 
negatively associated with firm performance. Although it is difficult to conclusively 
interpret this result as implying that accounting discretion is not used opportunistically by 
managers, it is a useful step forward in initiating discussion of the role of discretion 
afforded to executives.  
Given the key role that decision-rights allocation and discretion in decision-making 
play in organization structure, it would seem that further investigation of these issues is a 
fruitful avenue for future research. Most research to date on these issues focuses on how 
the use of discretion varies across corporations. It would be interesting, however, to better 
understand why the use of discretion varies across corporations and what economic factors 
determine firms decisions about how much discretion to allow their managers.     
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